Supreme Court Carino Case

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449

212 U. S. Syllabus.
which may be proved" in § 63a. In re Morales, 105 Fed. Rep.
761. No doubt at common law a false statement as to present
facts gave rise to an action of tort, if the statement was made
at the risk of the speaker, and led to harm. But ordinarily
the risk was not taken by the speaker unless the statement was
fraudulent, and. it was precisely because it was a warranty,
that is, an absolute undertaking by contract that a fact was
true, that if a warranty was alleged it was not necessary to lay

the scienter. Schuchardt v. Allens, 1 Wall. 359; Norton v. Do-
herty, 3 Gray, 372. In other words, a claim on a warranty as

such necessarily Was a claim arising out of a contract, even if
in case of actual fraud there might be an independent claim
purely in tort.

Judgment affirmed.

CARINO v. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT OF THE

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
No. 72. Argued January 13, 1909.-Decided February 23, 1909.

Writ of error is the general, and appeal the exceptional, method of bring-
ing cases to this court. The latter method is in the main confined to

equity cases and the former is proper to bring up a judgment of the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands affirming a judgment of the
Court of Land Registration dismissing an application for registration
of land.
Although a province may be excepted from the operation of act No. 926

of 1903 of the Philippine Commission which provides for the regis-
tration and perfecting of new titles, one who actually owns property

in such province is entitled to registration under act No. 496 of 1902,
which applies to the whole archipelago.
While, in legal theory and as against foreign nations, sovereignty is

absolute, practically it is a question of strength and of varying de-
gree; and it is for a new sovereign to decide how far it will insist upon

theoretical relations of the subject to the former sovereign and how
far it will. recognize actual facts.
VOL. ccxii-29

450

OCTOBER TERM, 1908.
Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 212 U. S.
The acquisition of the Philippines was not for the purpose of acquiring
the lands occupied by the inhabitants, and under the Organic Act of
July 1, 19062, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 691i providing that property rights are
to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants, one who actually
owned land, for many years cannot be deprived of it for failure to
comply with certain ceremonies prescribed either by the acts of the
Philippine Commission or by Spahish law.
The Organic Act of the Philippines made a bill of rights embodying
safeguards of -the ConstitUtioni , and, like the Constitution, extends
those safeguards to all.
Every presumption of ownership is in favor of one actually occupying
land for many years, and against the Government which seeks to

deprive him of it, for failure to comply with provisions of a subse-
quently enacted registration act.

-Title by prescription against the crown existed under Spanish law in
force in the Philippine Islands prior to their acquisition by the Uni-
.ted States, and one occupying land in the Province of Benguet for
more than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris is entitled to the
continued possession thereof.
7 Philippine Rep. 132, reversed.
The facts are stated in the. opinion.
Mr. Frederic R. C(oudert and Mr. Howard Thayer Kingsbury,
with'whom Mr. D. R. Williams and Mr. Charles C. Cohn were
on the brief, for plaintiff in error:

-The Land Registration Court had jurisdiction of the subject-
matter under act No. 496, §§ 2, 19; and its decision was legal,

just and in conformity with the protection of private property
provision of the Treaty of Paris. Public Land Act, No. 926.
This court has jurisdiction and writ of error is the proper
method.
The proceeding is one in rem and not in personam as it deals
with titles to real estate. See § 705, Rev. Stat.; 27 Stat. 434;
31Stat.1189, 1227; Ormsby v. Webb, 134U. S. 47; Met. Railroad
Co. y. Dist. of Columbia, 195 U. S. 322; Steinmetz v. Allen, 192
U. S. 543;.Lowry v. Allen, 203 U. S. 476; Smith v. Whitney, 116
U. S. 167; Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148, 158; Boston Mining
Co. v. Montana Ore Co., 188 U. S. 632, 641; Philippine Code
Civ, Pro.,.Act 190, Phil. Com., § 498.

451

212 U. B. Argument for Plaintiff in Error.
The land belonged to Carifio under the Igorot law. He had

inherited it from his ancestors in accordance with the na-
tive customs and his title had never been questioned. The

Spanish law explicitly recognized and scrupulously protected
the Indian titles. Possession of land under such circumstances
confers a property right jure gentium independently of any rule
of prescription.
Spanish law recognized and protected rights of the native

occupants of its Indian possessions even more fully and scrupu-
lously than our Government has done in the case of its Indian

wards. See. Arthur Helps, Spanish Conquest in America.
Claimant having actually possessed the land in question for
more than thirty years had acquired, under the Spanish Civil
Code, good prescriptive title. The provisions of this Code as to

prescription apply to all lands in the Philippine Islands regard-
less of whether owned by the Government or not, just as they

admittedly do in the Spanish Peninsula itself.

The provisions of the Civil Code applied to public agri-
cultural lands as well as to other lands, and a detailed examin-
ation of the provisions relating to public lands shows no in-
tention on the part of the Government to except them from

the purview of the Code enactments as to prescription, but on
the contrary recognize the applicability of -the common or

general law. Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Philippine, 537, to the ef-
fect. that public agricultural landg were not within the purview

of the Code provisions, is unsound, inconsistent with other deci-
sions of that court, and can be distinguished. Phil. Com. Rep.

1902, Part I, 183; Census of Philippine Islands, 1903, Vol. 1,
533; Phil. Com. Rep. 1904, Pt. I, 574; 1905, Pt. I, 176; "1
Bontoc Igorot," by Albert Ernest Jenks, Ethnological Survey
Publication, Interior Dept., Manila, P. I., 1905; United States
v. Paine Lumber Co., 206 U. S. 467; Lone Wolf v.JHitchcock,
187 U. S. 564; Doe v. Wilson, 23 How. 463; "Laws of the
Indies," Book 6, Title 1,, Law 1; and see in Book 6, Title 1,
Laws 15, 23, 27, 30, 32,; 'Book 6, Title 3, Laws 9, 26; 'Book 2,
Title 1, Laws 4, 5; Book 4, Title 1, Laws 6, 8, 10; Book. 4,

452

Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 212 U. S.
Title 12, Laws 5, 7, 9, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19; Justinian Code, Book 7,

Title 37, c. 1; Book 7, Title 39, c. 4, c. 9; Royal Decree, Febru-
ary 31, 1889; 2 Alcubilla (5th ed.), 692; Third Partida, Title 29,

Laws 7, 18, 21.
Translation of the Civil Code in force in Cuba, Porto Rico,
and the Philippines, 1893, War Dept. 1899, Arts. 339, 340, 342,
345; and Arts. 1930-6, 1959; Rosa v. Natalio, 7 Philippine, 556;
Francisco Aragon Gonzalez, decided by Supreme Court Spain,
April 16, 1881; 46 Jurisprudencia Civil, 9; Madrid, 1882; 3
Sanchez Roman, p. 277, and Alcubilla, 1906, 602; The Sixth
Partida, Title 19, Law 10; The Novisima Recopilacion, Book XI,
Title 8, Law 4; Ordenanzas Reales de Castilla, Book III,
Title 13, L. VI; Bracton, Lib. 2, c. 5, § 7, as cited by Story, J.,
in United States v. Hoar, 2 Mason, 311; S. C. Fed. Cas. No.
15,373; Pollock & Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, Vol. 1, 572; Vol. II,

144; Statute of 9 Geo. 111, 3, c. 16, Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Phil-
ippine, 540; Philippine "Mortgage Law," § 389; Royal Cedula

of October 15, 1754; Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, Arts. 4 and
5; "Guia de Compradores de Terrenos Baldios y Realengos de
Filipinas," Berriz, 1886, pp. 17-23; Spanish Civil Code, Arts. 348,
467, 1930, 1940, 1952, 1959, et seq.; "Land Registration Act"

of 1902, § 19, Cl. 1st; Law 1 and Law 2, Title 34, Book II, No-
visima Recopilacion; Alcubilla, Vol. 8, p. 776, note 4; Art. X,

Const. of Spain, June 30, 1876; Art. VIII, Regulations of 1880.
Carifio had a legal title under the Civil Code. Registration
was a mere procedural formality and did not create property.
In any event, he had a right of property under Spanish law
which was protected by the Treaty of Paris. Buenaventura
v. Commanding General, 6 Philippine, 601; Treaty of Paris;
Compilation of Treaties, 1904, 725; Delassus v. United States, 9
Peters, 133; Act temporarily to provide for the affairs of civil
government in Philippine Islands, July, 1902, §§ 12, 14, 16;

Public Land Act, No. 926, Comp. Laws and Regulations of Pub-
lic Lands in Philippine Islands War Dept., Bureau of Insular

Affairs, 1908, Chapter VI, § 54; Compilation of Laws and
Regulations relating to Public Lands-in the Philippine Islands.

453

Argument for Defendant in Error.
Government Ptg. Office, February 1, 1908; 3 Philippine, 543; 6

Philippine, 606; Strother v. Lucas (1838), 12 Peters, 436;,Philip-
pine Code Civ. Pro., § 41; Circular of August 10, publioned in

the Glaceia de Manila, 'August 11, 1881; Royal Decree of S -
tember 24, 1884, Art. 11; Royal Decree of February 13, 1894,
Art. 4, § 21.
The Solicitor General, with whom Mr. Paul Charlton was on
the brief, for defendant in error:
The court is without jurisdiction o iwrit of error. It can only
take jurisdiction on appeal. § 10, act of July 1, 1902; 32-Stat.

691. This court can only review actions at law pending in Cir-
cuit Courts by writ'of error and proceedings in equity only by

appeal. The proceedings for the adjudication and registration
of titles to lands in the Philippine Islands are in their nature

actions in equity rather than actions at law. Act No. 496, Phil-
ippine Commission, §§ 2, 14, 16, 21, 35-38, 40. See Holland v.

Challen, 110 U. S. 15; Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 195; Dower v.
Richards, 151 U. S. 658; Chase v. United States, 155 U. S. 480.
Plaintiff in error possessed no title in the lands at the date of
the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States.
During the period of Spanish sovereignty the tribe of Igorots
had not been segregated'from the body of the Philippine people
as to the operation of the general law; no reservation of land

was set aside for them, nor did the Spanish Government inter-
fere in their internal tribal affairs. The status of the Igorot

in his relation to the Spanish laws is not analogous to that of
the American Indian in relation to the laws of the United States,

and the cases affecting the tribal rights of Indians have no ap-
plication to any rights of plaintiff in error, jure gentium or other-
wise.

Plaintiff's claim of title advanced in the Philippine courts,
based mainly upon "prescription" as valid against the Crown
of Spain and therefore surviving the hange of sovereignty and

requiring to be recognized under the Treaty of Paris, is un-
tenable under Spanish law. While thai law made ample pro-

454

Argument for Defendant in Error. 212 U. S.
vision for the protection of rights claimed under ancient
possession, it was in each case necessary that evidence of title
should be submitted to the proper administrative officials.
4 Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indiao, law 1, title 12; Id., law 8;
Id., law 14; 4 Legislacion Ultramarina, 673; arts. 3, 4, 5; Id.,
p. 688; Gaceta de Manila, Nov. 15, 1864; Guia del Comprador
Terrenos, p. 5; Gaceta de Manila, Sept. 10, 1880; Id., Aug. 11,
1881; Id., April 17, 1894; see also Valenton v; Murciano, 3 Phil.

Rep. 537; Cansino v. Valdez, 6 Phil. Rep. 320; Tiglao v. In-
sular Government, 7 Phil. Rep. 80. The Spanish law in force

when the United States took possession of the Philippines re-
quired that all persons claiming title to public lands by pre-
scription should, long prior to that date, have presented and

proved their claims, complied with the legal regulations, and
secured title by administrative adjudication, upon penalty of
becoming mere trespassers and subject to ejectment. Plaintiff
in error. did not comply with these requirements, the time
within which he could have done so had long passed, and he
was therefore in the eyes of the law a trespasser on the public
lands of the Philippine Islands at the date when the islands

passed to the sovereignty of the United States. Under the ac-
cepted principles of international law the local laws of Spain

applicable to the Philippines, including the mortgage law and
the Civil Code, were continued in force by the Government of
the United States upon the cession of the islands, so far as they
were not incompatible with the fundamental principles of our
Government. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511; Cross v.
Harrison, 16 How. 164; Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 20 How. 176.
The situation of plaintiff in error has not been changed by
legislation of the United States or of the Philippine Islands
since the change of sovereignty. The act of March 2, 1901,
81 Stat. 910, continued the status of the public lands until
further action by Congress. The organic act of July 1, 1902,
empowered the Philippine Government created thereby to
- promulgate rules and regulations governing the public lands.
In pursuance of the powers so conferred, the Philippine Gov-

455

Opinion of the Court.
emnment established a court of land registration and prescribed
such rules and regulations. Philippine Acts, Nos. 496, 926.
These were, however, suspended as to the Province of Benguet

in which'the land in controversy is situated, and for that rea-
son there was no forum in which plaintiff could have legally

established the title he claimed. ' Accordingly the court of Land
Registration in attempting to hear and determine his rights
was without jurisdiction. This land was a-military reservation
of the United States, and military and other reservations were
excepted from the provision of the organic act .that property
acquired from Spain should be administered for the benefit of
the inhabitants of the Philippines. Further,. in reference to
the sale of public lands to actual occupants or settlers and
others, as in reference to perfecting title to those who prior to

the transfer of sovereignty had fulfilled all or some'of the con-
ditions required by the Spanish law for the acquisition of legal

title, yet had failed to secure conveyance of title, there is an
express restriction to an area of 16 hectares, and the tract here
contains 150 hectares. Sections 12, 16, act of July 1, 1902,
32 Stat. 691, 695, 696.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an application to the Philippine Court of Land Reg-
istration for the registration of certain land. The application

was granted by the court on March 4, 1904. An appeal was
taken to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Benguet,
on behalf of the Government of the Philippines and also on
behalf of the United States, those Governments having taken
possession of the property for public and military purposes.
The Court of First Instance found the facts and dismissed the
application upon grounds of law. This judgment was affirmed
by the Supreme Court, 7 Philippine, 132, and the case then was
brought here by writ of error. . The material facts found are very few. IThe applicant and
plaintiff in error is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where'
the land lies. For more than fifty years before the Treaty of

456

OCTOBER TERM, 1908.
Opinion of the Court. 212 U. S.
Paris, April 11, 1899, as far back as the findings go, the plaintiff
and his ancestors had held the land as owners. His grandfather
had lived upon it, and had maintained fences sufficient for the
holding of cattle, according to the custom of the country, some
of the fences, it seems, having been of much earlier date. His
father nad cultivated parts and had used parts for pasturing
cattle, and he had used it for pasture in his turn. They all had
been' recognized as owners by the Igorots, and he had inherited
or received the land from his father in accordance with Igorot
custom. No document of title, however, had issued from the
Spanish Crown, and although in 1893-1894, and again in 1896-
1897, he made application for one under the royal decrees then

in force, nothing seems to have come of it, unless, perhaps, in-
formation that lands in Benguet could not be conceded until

those to be occupied for a sanatorium, etc., had been designated,

a purpose that has been carried out by the Philippine Govern-
ment and the United States. In 1901 the plaintiff filed a peti-
tion, alleging ownership, under the mortgage law, and the lands

were registered to him, that process, however, establishing
only a possessory title, it is said: • Before we deal with the merits we must dispose of a technical
point. The Government has spent some energy in maintaining
that this case should have been brought up by appeal and not
by writ of error. We are of opinion, however, that the mode
adopted was right. The proceeding for registration is likened
to bills in equity to quiet title, but it is different in principle.
It is a proceeding in rem under a statute of the type of the Tor-

-ens Act, such as was discussed in Tyler v. Court of Registra-
tion, 175 Massachusetts, 71. It is nearer to law than to equity,

and is an assertion of legal title; but we think it unnecessary
to put it into either pigeon hole. A writ of error is the general
method of bringing cases to this court, an appeal the exception,

confined to equity in the main. There is no reason for not ap-
plying the general rule to this case. Ormsby v. Webb, 134 U. S.

47, 65; Campbell v. Porter,• 162 U. S. 478; Metropolitan R. R.
Co. v. Distric of Columbia, 195 U. S. 322.

457

Opinion of the Court.
Another preliminary matter may as well be disposed of here.

It is suggested that even if the applicant have title he can-
not have-it registered, because the Philippine Commission's Act

No. 926, of 1903, excepts the Province of Benguet among others
from its operation. But that act deals with the acquisition of

new titles by homestead entries, purchase, etc., and the perfec-
ting of titles begun under the Spanish law. The applicant's

claim is that he now owns the land and is entitled to registra-
tion under the Philippine Commission's Act No. 496, of 1902,

which established a court for that purpose with jurisdiction
"throughout the Philippine Archipelago," § 2, and authorized
in general terms applications to be made by persons claiming
to own the legal estate in fee simple, as the applicant does. He

is entitled to registration if his claim of ownership can be main-
tained.

We come then to the question on which the case was decided

below, namely, whether the plaintiff owns the land. The posi-
tion of the Government, shortly stated, is that Spain assumed,

asserted and had title to all the land in the Philippines except
so far as it saw fit to permit private titles to be acquired; that
there was no prescription against the Crown, and that if there
was, a decree of June 25, 1880, required registration within a
limited time to make the title good; that the plaintiff's land
was not registered and therefore became, if it was not always,
public land; that the United States succeeded to the title of
Spain, and so that the plaintiff has no rights that the Philippine
Government is bound to respect.

If we suppose for the moment that the Government's con-
tention is so far correct that the Crown of Spain in form as-
serted a title to this land at the date of the Treaty of Paris, to

which the United States succeeded, it is not to be assumed
without argument that the plaintiff's case is at an end. It is
true that Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the universal

feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown, and pr-
haps the general attitude of conquering nations tokvard people

not recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to those

458

Opinion of the Court. 212 U. S.
in the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true also
that in legal theory sovereignty is absolute, and that as against
foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spain asserted,

absolute power. But it does not follow that as against the in-
habitants of the Philippines the United States asserts that

Spain had such power. When theory is left on one side sover-
eignty is a question of strength and may vary in, degree. How

far a new sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical relation of

the subjects to the head in the past and how far it shall recog-
nize actual facts are matters for it to decide.

The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the
Solicitor General, in his argument, characterized as a savage

tribe that never was brought under the civil or military gov-
ernment of the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not cer-
tain, that the Spanish officials would not have granted to any

one in that province the registration to which formerly the
plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish laws, and which would
have made his title beyond question good. Whatever may
have been the technical position of Spain, it does not follow
that, in the view of the United States, he had lost all rights and
was a mere trespasser ,when the present Government seized his
land. The argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial
of native titles throughout an important part of the island of
Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards
would not have permitted and had not the power to enforce.

The acquisition of the Philippines was nof like the settle-
ment of the white race in the United States, Whatever consid-
eration may have been shown to the North American Indians,

the dominant purpose of the whites in America was to occupy
the land. It is obvious that, however stated, the reason for our
taking'over the Philippines was different. No one, we suppose,
would deny that, so far as consistent with paramount necessities,
our first object in the internal administration of the islands is

,to do justice to the natives, not to exploit their country for pri-
vate gain. By the organic act of July 1, 1902, c.. 1369, § 12, 32

Stat. 691, ,all the property and rights acquired there by the

459

 

Opinion of the Court.

United States are to be administered "for the, benefit of the in-
habitants thereof." It is reasonable to suppose that the attitude

thus assumed by the United States with regard to what was
unquestionably its own is also its attitude in deciding what it
will claim for its own. The same statute made a bill of rights
embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the
Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It provides that
"no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws."
§ 5. In the light of the declaration that we have quoted from
§ 12, it is hard to believe that the .United States was ready to
declare in the next breath that "any person" did not embrace
the inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by f' property " only

that which had become such by ceremon ies of which presum-
ably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard, and that

it proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom

and by long association, one of the profoundest factors in hu-
man thought, regarded as their own.

It is true that by § 14 the Governnfent of the Philippines is
empowered to enact rules and prescribe terms for perfecting
titles to public lands where some but not all Spanish conditions
had been fulfilled, and to issue patents to natives for not more
than sixteen hectares of public lands actually occupied by the
native or his ancestors before August 13, 1898. But this section

perhaps might be satisfied if confined to cases where the occu-
pation was of land admitted to be public land and had not con-
tinued for such a length of time and under such circumstances

as to give rise to the understanding that the occupant were

owners at that date. We hesitate to suppose that it was in-
tended to declare every native who had not a paper title a tres-
passer and to set the claims of all the wilder tribes afloat. It is

true again that there is excepted from the provision that we
have quoted as'to the administration of the property and rights;
acquired by the United States, such land and property as
shall be designated by the President for military or other reser-

460

OCTOBER TERM, 1908.
Opinion of the Court. 212 U. S.
vations, as this land since has been. But there still remains

the question what property and rights the United States as-
serted itself to have acquired.

Whatever the law upon these points may be, and we mean
to go no further than the necessities of decision demand, every
presumption is and ought to be against the Government in a

case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and suffi-
cient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory

goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of
private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the
same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have
been public land. Certainly in a case like this if there is doubt
or ambiguity in the Spanish law we ough- to give the applicant
the benefit of the doubt. Whether justice to the natives and the
import of the organic act ought not to carry us beyond a subtle

examination of ancient texts, or perhaps even beyond the atti-
tude of Spanish law, humane though it was, it is unnecessary

.to decide. If, in a tacit way, it was assumed that the wild tribes

of the Philippines were to be dealt with as the power and incli-
nation of the conqueror .might dictate, Congress has not yet

sanctioned the samie course as the proper one "foe the benefit
of the inhabitants thereof."
If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain we do
not discover such clear proof that it was bad by that law as to
satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with, the
older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in

error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the natives were rec-
ognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant.

In other words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native
inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers or even into
tenants at will. For instance, Book 4t Title 12, Law 14 of
the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary
conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Philippine, 537, while it
commands viceroys and others, when it seems proper, to call
for the exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who
hold by good grants or justa prescripcion. It is true that it

461

Opinion of the-Court.
begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship.
and the origin of all titles in the king or his predecessors. That

was theory and discourse. The fact was that titles were ad-
mitted to exist that owed nothing to the, powers of Spain be-
yond this recognition in their books.

Prescription is mentioned again in the royal cedula of Octo-
ber 15, 1754, cited in 3 Philippine, 546: "Where such possessors

shall not be able to produce title deeds it shall be sufficient if

they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by pro-
scription." It may be that this means possession from before

1700, but at all events the principle is admitted. As prescrip-
tion, even against crown lands, was recognized by the laws of

Spain, we see no sufficient reason for hesitating to admit that
it- was recognized in the Philippines in regard to lands over
which Spain had only a paper sovereignty.
The question comes however on the decree of June 25, 1880,

for the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by pri-
vate individuals in the Philippine Islands. This begins with

the usual theoretic assertion that for private ownership there
must have been a grant by competent authority, but instantly
descends to fact by providing that for all legal effects those
who have been in possession for certain times shall be deemed
owners. For cultivated land, twenty years uninterrupted is
enough. For uncultivated, thirty. Art. 5. So that when this
decree went into effect the applicant's father was owner of the
land by the very terms of the decree. But it is said, the object

of this law was to require the adjustment or registration pro-
ce' dings that it described, and in that way to require every one

to get a document of title or lose his land. That purpose may
have been entertained; but 'it does not appear clearly to have
been applicable to all. The regulations purport to have been
made "for the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied

by private individuals." (We follow the translation in the Gov-
ernment's brief.) It does not appear that this land ever was

royal land or wrongfully occupied. In art. 6 it is provided
that '
" interested parties, not included within the two preceding

462

Opinion of the Court. 212 U. S.
articles [the articles recognizing prescription of twenty and
thirty years] may legaflize their possession, and thereby acquire
the full ownership of thd said lands, by means of adjustment
proceedings, to be conducted in the following manner." This
seems by its very terms not to apply to those declared already
to be owners by lapse of time. Article 8 provides for the case
of parties not asking an adjustment of the lands of which they
are unlawfully enjoying the possession, within one year, and
threatens that the treasury "will -reassert the ownership of the
State over the lands," and will sell at auction such part as it
does not reserve.' The applicant's possession was not unlawful
and no attempt at any such proceedings against him or his
father ever was made. Finally, it should be noted that the
natural construction of the decree is confirmed by the report
of the Council of State. That report puts forward as a reason
for the regulations that, in view of. the condition of almost all
property in the Philippines, it is important to fix its status by
general rules on the principle that the lapse of a fixed period
legalizes completely all possession; recommends in two articles
'twenty and thirty years, as adopted in the decree; and then
suggests that interested parties not included in those articles

may legalize their possession and acquire ownership by adjust-
ment at a certain price.

It is true that the language of arts. 4 and 5 attributes title to
those "who may prove" possession for the necesssary time,
and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove

in registration proceedings. It may be that an English con-
veyancer would have recommended an application under the

foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey
to the mind of an Igorot chief the, notion that ancient family
possessions, were in danger, if he had read every. word of it.
The words "may prove," (acrediten), as well, or better, in view
of the other provisions, might be' taken to mean when called
upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show
that for want of it 'ownership actually gained would be lost.

463

SANTOS v. ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH.
212 U. S. Syllabus.
The effect of the proof wherever made was not to confer title,
but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree,
if not by earlier law. The royal decree of February 13, 1894,
declaring forfeited titles that were capable of adjustment under
the decree of 1880, for which adjustment had not been sought
should not be, construed as a confiscation, but as the withdrawal
of a privilege. As a matter of fact, the applicant never was
disturbed. This same decree is quoted by the Court of Land

Registration for another recognition, of the common law pre-
scription of thirty years as still running against alienable crown

land.
It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the
Spanish law present a problem not without difficulties for courts
of a different legal tradition. We have deemed it proper on

that account to notice the possible effect of the change of sover-
eignty and the act of Congress establishing the fundamental

principles now to be observed. Upon a consideration of the
whole case we are of opinion that law and justice require that
the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not
be deprived of what,, by the practice and belief of those among

whom he lived, was his property, through a refined interpreta-
tion of an almost forgotten law of Spain.

Judgment reversed.

SANTOS v. HOLY ROMAN CATHOLIC AND APOSTOLIC
CHURCH, PARISH OF TAMBOBONG.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
No. 73. Submitted January 13, 1909.-Decided February 23, 1909.
A finding by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands that the parties
sued as defendants do not constitute a judicial entity such as a
colradia, is not' open to rebxaminatio'n in this court.
Where the reasons of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands for
refusing to grant a new trial on ground of newly discovered evidence